Page 30 - ePaper
P. 30
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2014
of an (un)adjusted European Social Chart 25: Old–age dependency ratio in EU-28
63
Model ( ) (Chart 25).
0.6
In order to encourage and assist older
people to remain active longer, appropri - 0.5
ate policy responses or incentives will 0.4
need to be targeted on both workers
and firms, since market forces alone 0.3
are unlikely to succeed given that the
decision on whether to retire or remain 0.2
in the labour market is a complex one,
and not just dependent on financial 0.1
64
considerations ( ). 0
2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual and household characteristics
will play their part, including the worker’s Source: DG EMPL calculations on the basis of Eurostat EUROPOP2013 – Population projections.
education level ( ), the health of both Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the ration between the population aged 65+ and the population
65
the worker and spouse, and the spouse’s aged 16-64.
activity. Institutional factors include the
way older earners are treated in tax- Chart 26: Convergence in EPL on regular employment, 2008-13
benefit schemes, the retirement eligibil-
ity conditions, and the influence of the 0.6
statutory retirement age.
Factors affecting differences 0.1 IE DK SI SE
in employment rates, including AT BE PL LU FI IT DE NL
employment protection UK HU ES EU FR CZ
legislation Change in EPL regular, 2008-13 -0.4 SK EL
Many factors affect the differences in -0.9 EE
labour market outcomes of different
groups with their relative importance PT
being almost always country-specific -1.4
3.0
2.5
and including structural issues as labour 1.0 1.5 2.0 EPL regular, 2008 3.5 4.0 4.5
taxation and benefits (and the associ-
ated unemployment and inactivity traps), Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics, Strictness of employment protection
childcare access, retirement rules, the legislation: regular employment, Version 3 (EU = median of available Member States).
level of minimum wages, the labour mar -
ket adequacy of the education system,
as well as cyclical issues such as the EPL seeks to balance the interests of to combat labour market segmentation
strength of demand. firms and workers. Firms have to be (Chart 26), although Greece and Spain
able to adapt their operations quickly, have also reduced protection of tempo-
In this chapter, some of these factors including adjusting the size and composi - rary contracts ( ).
67
are discussed when the labour market tion of their workforce, while the workers
outcome of a specific group is discussed, need protection against job loss. There Large costs and rights differences
others when the general obstacles for job are the publicly borne financial and between permanent and non-standard
68
creation are reviewed. Often it is argued social costs linked to unemployment. work ( ) contracts are seen to encourage
that employment protection legislation Productive economies also need moti- companies to opt for a prominent use
(EPL) – essentially the set of rules gov- vated workers willing to contribute to the of the latter. As a consequence, these
66
erning hiring and firing ( ) of employ- success of their company and a certain jobs often do not serve as a stepping-
ees – has a strong link to labour market degree of job protection can encourage stone to more permanent forms of work
segmentation and hence can be harmful such behaviour. and rarely provide for sufficient access
for new entrants. to lifelong learning, social protection
EPL legislation has evolved in recent (including pension rights) and monetary
( ) See also Peschner and Fotakis (2013) and years with around half of Member States protection in the case of termination
63
European Commission and the Economic having reduced protection on regular without fault. This is one aspect of labour
Policy Committee (2012).
( ) See also ‘Chapter 5: Active ageing’ in employment with the objective of helping market segmentation, with protected
64
European Commission (2011a).
( ) Older workers with higher education levels ( ) Please note that the EPL data are only
65
67
have higher participation rates. available for OECD member countries,
66
( ) The hiring rules are the conditions for the excluding the other eight EU Member States
use of standard and non-standard labour from the analysis.
68
contracts. The firing rules are the rules ( ) Such as fixed-term contracts, temporary
on individual and collective dismissals of agency work, part-time work and
workers on standard permanent contracts. independent contract work.
28
of an (un)adjusted European Social Chart 25: Old–age dependency ratio in EU-28
63
Model ( ) (Chart 25).
0.6
In order to encourage and assist older
people to remain active longer, appropri - 0.5
ate policy responses or incentives will 0.4
need to be targeted on both workers
and firms, since market forces alone 0.3
are unlikely to succeed given that the
decision on whether to retire or remain 0.2
in the labour market is a complex one,
and not just dependent on financial 0.1
64
considerations ( ). 0
2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Individual and household characteristics
will play their part, including the worker’s Source: DG EMPL calculations on the basis of Eurostat EUROPOP2013 – Population projections.
education level ( ), the health of both Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the ration between the population aged 65+ and the population
65
the worker and spouse, and the spouse’s aged 16-64.
activity. Institutional factors include the
way older earners are treated in tax- Chart 26: Convergence in EPL on regular employment, 2008-13
benefit schemes, the retirement eligibil-
ity conditions, and the influence of the 0.6
statutory retirement age.
Factors affecting differences 0.1 IE DK SI SE
in employment rates, including AT BE PL LU FI IT DE NL
employment protection UK HU ES EU FR CZ
legislation Change in EPL regular, 2008-13 -0.4 SK EL
Many factors affect the differences in -0.9 EE
labour market outcomes of different
groups with their relative importance PT
being almost always country-specific -1.4
3.0
2.5
and including structural issues as labour 1.0 1.5 2.0 EPL regular, 2008 3.5 4.0 4.5
taxation and benefits (and the associ-
ated unemployment and inactivity traps), Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics, Strictness of employment protection
childcare access, retirement rules, the legislation: regular employment, Version 3 (EU = median of available Member States).
level of minimum wages, the labour mar -
ket adequacy of the education system,
as well as cyclical issues such as the EPL seeks to balance the interests of to combat labour market segmentation
strength of demand. firms and workers. Firms have to be (Chart 26), although Greece and Spain
able to adapt their operations quickly, have also reduced protection of tempo-
In this chapter, some of these factors including adjusting the size and composi - rary contracts ( ).
67
are discussed when the labour market tion of their workforce, while the workers
outcome of a specific group is discussed, need protection against job loss. There Large costs and rights differences
others when the general obstacles for job are the publicly borne financial and between permanent and non-standard
68
creation are reviewed. Often it is argued social costs linked to unemployment. work ( ) contracts are seen to encourage
that employment protection legislation Productive economies also need moti- companies to opt for a prominent use
(EPL) – essentially the set of rules gov- vated workers willing to contribute to the of the latter. As a consequence, these
66
erning hiring and firing ( ) of employ- success of their company and a certain jobs often do not serve as a stepping-
ees – has a strong link to labour market degree of job protection can encourage stone to more permanent forms of work
segmentation and hence can be harmful such behaviour. and rarely provide for sufficient access
for new entrants. to lifelong learning, social protection
EPL legislation has evolved in recent (including pension rights) and monetary
( ) See also Peschner and Fotakis (2013) and years with around half of Member States protection in the case of termination
63
European Commission and the Economic having reduced protection on regular without fault. This is one aspect of labour
Policy Committee (2012).
( ) See also ‘Chapter 5: Active ageing’ in employment with the objective of helping market segmentation, with protected
64
European Commission (2011a).
( ) Older workers with higher education levels ( ) Please note that the EPL data are only
65
67
have higher participation rates. available for OECD member countries,
66
( ) The hiring rules are the conditions for the excluding the other eight EU Member States
use of standard and non-standard labour from the analysis.
68
contracts. The firing rules are the rules ( ) Such as fixed-term contracts, temporary
on individual and collective dismissals of agency work, part-time work and
workers on standard permanent contracts. independent contract work.
28
